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Abstract 
This paper examines the related but different concepts of the uncanny and the sacred.  
Drawing on two cases –  one fictional and one real – and using Žižek’s Symbolic-Real-
Imaginary as an organising frame, the paper analyses how the uncanny and the sacred are 
connected.  It then proceeds to examine the role of theorising in sacralising the uncanny and 
profaning the sacred.  Finally, it briefly discusses how theory might be re-enchanted. 
Keywords:  uncanny, sacred, theory. 
 
Introduction 
This EGOS stream punctuates a recent wave of interest in the uncanny in organizational 
discourse.  Orr (2014) has just published an article on ‘organizational ghosts’, Gabriel (2012) 
has written about ‘organizational miasma’, while last year Organization Studies published a 
special issue on the ‘dark side’ of organisation (O'Doherty et al. 2013) including a paper 
specifically on the uncanny by Beyes and Steyaert (2013).  Of course, the supernatural is 
pervasive in popular culture and so it is no surprise that the uncanny is explored much more 
vigorously in literary studies, most especially by Royle (2003) and more recently by 
Masschelein (2011), both of whom position their work as an elaboration on Freud’s 
(1919/2003) seminal essay, The Uncanny.  In turn, Freud is indebted to Jentsch (1906/1997), 
who provides a second foundational study of the phenomenon.  
A ready link between organization and the uncanny is that the former, as a manifestation of 
rational structures and behaviour, works to contain if not eradicate the latter, which is seen as 
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nothing but a relic of a pre-modern world view that has yet to jettison superstition, religion, 
and all things metaphysical.  Another approach is to see the uncanny as a natural part of the 
human condition – without need to leverage metaphysical explanations – and that 
organisation is but a device to tame or make sense of a bewildering world in which the 
uncanny is to be expected, albeit only occasionaly.  Organisation is nothing but a (never 
wholly successful) attempt to manage existential angst through practices that, firstly, distract 
us through immersion in the practice’s particularities, and, secondly, work to create a 
familiar, ordinary, mundane world from which the uncanny is necessarily decanted.  And 
when that project inevitably stumbles we find some succour through appealing to the concept 
and word ‘uncanny’.  In this paper, I follow a third route, one that retains the metaphysical 
language (which distinguishes it from the second approach), but does not embrace the pre-
modern/modern distinction that frames the first approach.  Specifically, the paper explores 
the relationship between the uncanny and the sacred, arguing that the uncanny – as in the 
unfamiliar and potentially dangerous – needs to be tamed, domesticated and made familiar, 
and that sacralisation is an important process through which this is achieved.  In this sense, 
the uncanny and the sacred are necessarily closely connected and it is this connection – which 
is surprisingly overlooked in the call for papers – that is explored here.  While the two terms 
are related, they are also different in important ways. The dictionary tells us that the uncanny 
refers to the ‘strange or mysterious, especially in an unsettling ways’, while its synonyms 
include words like preternatural, supernatural, unearthly, other-worldly, unreal, odd and 
weird.  The word ‘sacred’ shares none of these synonyms, but, like the uncanny, is certainly 
linked with the unearthly in that its dictionary meaning is given as ‘connected with God or a 
god or dedicated to a religious purpose and so deserving veneration’. 
The paper begins by reprising our understanding of the sacred, and maps out twelve attributes 
of the phenomenon, which provides a frame for contrasting with the uncanny.  The next 
section uses two cases – one ficitional, one real – to analyse how the uncanny and the sacred 
are connected, using Žižek’s Symbolic-Real-Imaginary as a conceptual frame.  In developing 
these ideas, the paper examines the role of theorising in sacralising the uncanny and 
profaning the sacred.  The paper concludes with a short discussion on how theory might 
perhaps be re-enchanted.  
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The sacred and the uncanny 
We begin by summarising the attributes of the sacred, drawing on the quite extensive 
literature on the subject.  For Durkheim, the sacred-profane dichotomy was foundational to 
all religions, which he famously defined as ‘a unified system of beliefs and practices relative 
to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden – beliefs and practices which 
unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them’ 
(Durkheim 1915/1995: 47).  Moreover, he argued that  
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristic: they 
presuppose a classification of all things, real and ideal, of which men think, into two classes or 
opposed groups, generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the 
words profane and sacred (Durkheim 1915/1995: 37, original emphasis). 
The anthropologist Malinowski concurs: ‘In every primitive community, studied by 
trustworthy and competent observers, there have been found two clearly distinguishable 
domains, the Sacred and the Profane; in other words, the domain of Magic and Religion and 
that of Science’ (Malinowski 1948:17). However, subsequent scholars have taken issue with 
this essentialism and universalism, with Evans-Pritchard (1937/1976; 1940) arguing that 
‘religion’, and distinctions between the natural and supernatural or between the sacred and 
profane were not features of tribes like the Azande or the Nuer.  Goody (1961) also rejected 
Durkheim’s foundationalist view, arguing that many societies do not have words equivalent 
to sacred or profane and that the sacred-profane dichotomy, as well as distinctions between 
the natural and supernatural (and, by extension, the conceptual carapace framing the idea of 
the uncanny), are more a feature of European religious thought rather than a universal aspect 
of all religions.  
Yet, it would be imprudent to jettison the concept of the sacred altogether, even if we don’t 
buy Durkheim’s notion that the sacred-profane distinction is an essential and basic feature of 
all religions.  This makes much sense because the sacred and its associated constellation of 
terms has continued to provide an important framing device for thinking about individual and 
social phenomena (Eliade 1959/1961; Girard 1977/1995; Acquaviva 1979; Reason 1993; 
Taylor 2007; Kauffman 2008; Walsh 2011).  It is perhaps no surprise that anthropologists and 
sociologists of religion continue to use the concept, but it is also very much present in 
management and organisation studies.  For instance, the idea of the sacred runs through the 
‘explosion in interest’ in workplace spirituality (Parameshwar 2005: 690), while for James 
March, the noted organisational theorist, the sacred is central to academic life: ‘Teaching is 
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not a job,’ he maintains, ‘it is a sacrament’ (March 2003: 206).  In marketing scholarship, the 
sacred features as a distinct strand following on from Belk, Wallendorf and Sherry’s seminal 
paper on The Sacred and the Profane in Consumer Behaviour (Belk et al. 1989).   
Interestingly, while that paper has achieved ‘mythical status within our discipline’ according 
to Brown and Schau (2008: 154), this is primarily because of its novel use of interpretative 
research methods to understand the symbolic meaning of consumption rather than its specific 
interest in the notion of the sacred, which is what concerns us most in this paper.   
Nevertheless, Belk et al’s study is helpful, not least because it maps out twelve properties of 
the sacred (Table 1, first two columns) based on their extensive reading of the literature. 
Property The Sacred The Uncanny 
Hierophany Something sacred shows itself to us.  
Phenomenologically, people do not create 
sacred things. 
The uncanny is that which ought to have 
remained hidden and secret but has 
become visible (see Freud 1919/2003). 
Kratophany The sacred elicits both strong approach 
and strong avoidance tendencies, creating 
an overwhelming power. 
The uncanny shares this property, though 
it also creates a lack of orientation.  
Mystery The sacred has conferred upon it a dignity 
that raises it above the ordinary or 
‘empirical’. It cannot be understood 
cognitively, for the sacred commands 
love, devotion, fear, and related spiritual 
or emotional responses rather than 
rational thought. 
The uncanny shares this sense of mystery, 
but does not command the same 
emotional responses; rather it brings an 
overwhelming feeling of uncertainty.  
Objectification The translation of elements of mundane 
existence into a transcendental frame of 
reference  
The uncanny shares this property. 
Opposition to 
the profane 
The extraordinary sacred is partly defined 
by its opposition to the ordinary profane. 
The uncanny is opposed to (or 
commingled with) the familiar rather than 
the profane. 
Contamination Both beneficent and evil sacred things 
have the power to contaminate through 
contact.  
Not an attribute of the uncanny. 
Sacrifice Sacrifice establishes communication with 
the sacred. 
Not an attribute of the uncanny. 
Myth Narratives document the status of the 
sacred and partly constitute that status.  
The uncanny is an ‘unconcept’ 
(Masschelein 2011) and, as such, is pre-
mythological. 
Commitment Individuals feel an emotional attachment 
to that which is considered sacred and this 
is important to their identity. 
The uncanny upsets rather than constitutes 
identity. 
Ritual Rules of conduct prescribe how one 
should conduct oneself in the presence of  
sacred objects  
Rules of conduct are absent because the 
uncanny is a ‘crisis of the proper’ (Royle 
2003: 1). 
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Communitas The social anti-structure that frees 
participants from their normal social roles 
and statuses and instead engages them in a 
transcending camaraderie of status 
equality. 
Not an attribute of the uncanny. 
Ecstasy and 
Flow 
The sacred is capable of producing 
ecstatic experience, in which one stands 
outside one's self. 
Not an attribute of the uncanny. 
Table 1: Twelve Properties of the Sacred (adapted from Belk et al. 1989) contrasted with the uncanny. 
Each of these twelve properties of the sacred may then be compared and contrasted with the 
uncanny, and this is done in the third column of Table 1.  While each of the comparisons 
might be contested, they do highlight the overlaps and important points of departure between 
the two concepts.   Or perhaps a better way to put it is between the concept of the sacred and 
the ‘unconcept’ that is the uncanny (Masschelein 2011). 
In analysing the relationship between the sacred and the uncanny, we leverage Žižek’s (via 
Lacan) triad of the three domains of experience – the Symbolic, Real and Imaginary (Žižek 
1989; 2006; Bailly 2009).  The Symbolic is the domain of language and representation, as 
well as the network of rules and suppositions that constitute the symbolic order.  The Real is 
not that which we normally understand as ‘reality’, but rather that which is always beyond 
representation, beyond the Symbolic, or, as Žižek puts it, it is ‘the impossible hard core 
which we cannot confront directly’ (Žižek 2006: 26). The Imaginary relates to the totalising 
effects of seeking to construct a coherent narrative in an attempt (which always fails) to 
bridge the gap between the Symbolic and the Real.  It is the realm of identity linked to ideal 
images and destructive status games. Within this frame, the uncanny is best understood as 
part of the Real, while the sacred is primarily located in the Imaginary.   
Freud, in his essay on the uncanny, notes that he ‘cannot think of any genuine fairy-story 
which has anything uncanny about it’ (Freud 1919/2003: 16).  Why might this be so, given 
that fairy-tales are crammed with inanimate objects springing to life, re-animation of the 
dead, wish-fulfillments, secret powers, monsters, gouls and goblins, all of which feature as 
part of the uncanny?  Freud’s answer is that there is a difference between the uncanny that is 
actually experienced and the uncanny that we merely picture or read about.  Thus, fairy-tales 
are framing devices that contain or tame the uncanny; the uncanny, through a fairy tale, is 
rendered familiar – normal even – part of a particular language game understood by both the 
story-teller and the audience.  And so it is with the sacred, which works to domesticate the 
uncanny, while at the same time creating and maintaining a position for the supernatural and 
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cosmic.  This paper’s argument is that the uncanny, as part of the Real, is translated into the 
sacred through the practice of theorizing, drawing on mythological narratives that constitute 
the Imaginary while using the modes of representation and rules of language that form the 
Symbolic. 
An Illustration 
Steven Speilberg’s movie, War Horse (2011), recounts a story about a boy who enlists to 
fight in the First World War after his beloved racehorse is sold to the cavalry.  The movie 
includes at least two uncanny moments.  First, when the young horse saves the farm by 
ploughing a rocky field that would be beyond the ability of most work horses.  The event is 
witnessed by dozens of neighbours who watch in awe at the horse’s preternatural ability.  The 
second uncanny moment occurs on the battlefield where the boy, who has been blinded after 
being gassed in the trenches, hears about a wonder horse that has survived in no-man’s-land.  
Believing it to be his own animal, he whistles for the horse as he did when he was a child.  At 
that moment, the injured horse was about to be put down, but, uncannily, hears the whistle, is 
reunited with the boy, and his life is saved.  This is but one fictional story with uncanny 
elements – it so happens to be the last movie I watched – and indeed the uncanny is routinely 
included as a plot device simply to make a story more interesting.  However, when the 
uncanny is depicted in fiction, we know it is fiction, which is why fairy-tales, as Freud 
reminds us, are not uncanny.  However, uncanny in the ‘real’ world, the truly uncanny, is a 
horse of quite a different colour.   
For a real-life story of the uncanny, we turn to a phenomenon that occurred in Ireland during 
the summer of 1985.  It began in County Cork in the small village of Ballinspittle where a 
roadside statue of the Virgin was reported to have moved spontaneously.  (Inanimate objects 
apparently springing into life is a quintessential example of the uncanny.)  Similar 
occurrences were reported at around 30 other locations around the country during that 
summer, often at grottos erected during the Marian Year of 1954.  Thousands went to see 
what many believed were apparitions and it was reported that up to 100,000 visited the 
Ballinspittle site alone (Mulholland 2009).   The media popularised the term ‘moving statues’ 
because the people who witnessed the phenomena often reported that a statue levitated, 
gestured, or moved in some way.   
There’s a long history of apparitions in the Catholic Church, and the ‘moving statues’ story is 
best understood within that context.  The Catholic Church has recognised hundreds of official 
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Marian shrines across the world, including Lourdes (France) which receives five million 
pilgrims annually and Knock (Ireland) which receives one and a half million. The uncanny 
event that Lourdes celebrates is an apparition of the Virgin Mary in 1858, while Knock 
commemorates the appearance of the Virgin Mary, St Joseph and St John to fifteen 
individuals in 1879.   The Catholic Church has a formal protocol, Normae Congregationis1, 
for adjudicating on the veracity of apparitions, which is an important part of the process 
through which an uncanny event comes to be recast as something that is authentically sacred; 
it is, in effect, a formal process of sacralisation.  The Knock apparitions were investigated by 
two Church Commissions of Inquiry in 1879 and 1936 and these deemed the witnesses’ 
testimony as trustworthy and satisfactory. In 1979, Pope John Paul visited the shrine on the 
centenary of the apparition, giving Knock the indelible seal of Vatican approval and inspiring 
an even greater devotion to the shrine. Almost half a million pilgrims gathered at Knock on 
that day.  However, other well-known sites have not yet received such official affirmation.  
For instance, in June 1981 four children reported seeing an apparition of the Virgin Mary in 
the village of Međugorje in what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Other uncanny 
phenomena were subsequently reported at the site, such as the sun spinning and dancing in 
the sky, or being surrounded by hearts or crosses. The events were investigated by a series of 
Church commissions with each declaring non constat: that is, they could not confirm the 
supernatural nature of the apparitions. In 1985 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger – then prefect of 
the doctrinal congregation and the future Pope Benedict XVI – banned official, diocesan or 
parish-sponsored pilgrimages to the shrine. In 2008, the Vatican authorized ‘severe 
cautionary and disciplinary measures’ against the priest who served as spiritual director to the 
visionaries, sanctioning him ‘for the diffusion of dubious doctrine, manipulation of 
consciences, suspicious mysticism, disobedience toward legitimately issued orders’ as well as 
charges that he violated the Sixth Commandment.2  Despite this, over one million pilgrims 
still visit Medjugorje every year (http://www.medjugorje.hr/en/). 
In the summer of 1985, it is probable that some canny individuals saw the potential for 
Ballinspittle to emulate Knock, given that the village is only 30km from Cork International 
Airport and close to over a kilometre of sandy beach. However, this was not to be. The 
Catholic Church sat on the fence, recognizing that while interest in the phenomenon would 
                                                            
1 Available at: http://bit.ly/SqJER4 [accessed 9th June, 2014]. 
2 Press Release by Catholic News Services, 5th September 2008, Vatican disciplines ex-spiritual director to 
Medjugorje visionaries; available at:  http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0804522.htm accessed 9th 
June 2014] 
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probably fade, it was unwilling to dismiss what might, in time, be considered an authentic 
apparition (Mulholland 2009).  The media and wider public were more cynical, and, 
notwithstanding the large numbers travelling to the various sites where uncanny events had 
happened, the ‘moving statutes’ phenomenon was routinely ridiculed in the press and in 
popular culture (Ryan and Kirakowski 1985).  Thus, the summer of 1985 was a time when 
different images of the uncanny competed with one another.  On the one hand, there were 
attempts to reimagine the uncanny happenings as part of the sacred, or in Žižek’s triad, to 
make sense of the Real (the uncanny) within a prior and evolving Imaginary, namely the 
mythological, theological and sacred traditions and narratives of the Catholic Church.  Others 
reimagined the uncanny events using other narratives and traditions of the Imaginary.  For 
example, two psychologists wrote a book claiming that the visions were optical illusions 
caused by staring at objects in the evening twilight (Ryan and Kirakowski 1985), while 
Mulholland (2009) leveraged a range of sociological, historical, theological, and 
psychological narratives to make sense of the ‘moving statues’, which he saw as a   
modern manifestation of the kind of ‘magical-devotionalism’ that sections of the Irish Catholic 
population have long been prone to resort to during periods of personal or collective distress…  
They were products of an authoritarian, pessimistic, and guilt ridden religious ethos that stymied the 
emotional, religious, and cognitive development of many Irish children, undermined their capacity 
for self reflection and the possibility of developing a mature capacity for containing their inner fears 
and anxieties (p. 176).     
But the most telling contribution was made by three Pentecostalists who, on 31st October, 
attacked the statue with a hammer and axe claiming that the pilgrims were engaged in 
idolatry (the worship of images) or Mariolatry (Marian veneration) both of which are 
antithetical to Protestant religious beliefs. While the statue was subsequently repaired, the 
crowds never returned and the events of that summer were soon forgotten.  The grotto in 
Ballinspittle never became a sacred place – at least no more than any of the thousands of 
other grottos in Ireland – it never competed in the international Marian market, and it never 
even made the list of Irish Marian shrines.3 
The ‘moving statues’ story illustrates how theorizing can successfully or unsuccessfully 
transform the uncanny (the Real) into the sacred through drawing on narratives (theories) and 
practices that constitute the Imaginary. Theory, in this sense, operates on the uncanny and 
                                                            
3 See http://campus.udayton.edu/mary/resources/shrines/ireland.html [accessed 9th June 2014]. 
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transforms it, making it familiar and (perhaps) sacred and somewhat understandable.  Thus, 
the sacred is a potential, but not necessary, outcome of theorising the uncanny.   
Yet, theorising the uncanny is problematic because it always and necessarily fail to truly 
represent the phenomenon, because the uncanny is axiomatically beyond representation (just 
as a joke is ‘lost’ in explanation). The uncanny is perhaps best understood as the part of life 
(and death) that cannot be symbolically appropriated or expressed, even through concepts 
such as the Real and différance that seek to speak to the impossibility of meaning.  The first 
line of the Tao te Ching captures the sense of mystery that is an axiomatic attribute of the 
uncanny (and the sacred): “The Tao that can be spoken of is not the enduring and unchanging 
Tao. The name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name”, echoing the last 
line in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof 
one must be silent’ (Wittgenstein 1922). 
Attempts to theorise the uncanny has another problem in that the theorist is interested in and 
focused on ideas, such as the idea of the uncanny, which is quite different from any particular 
instance of the uncanny.  This is precisely why Jentsch eschews any attempt to define the 
essence of the phenomenon:  
Such a conceptual explanation would have very little value. The main reason for this is that the same 
impression does not necessarily exert an uncanny effect on everybody. Moreover, the same perception on 
the part of the same individual does not necessarily develop into the ‘uncanny’ every time, or at least not 
every time in the same way (Jentsch 1906/1997: 8).  
Notwithstanding this epistemological difficulty, Jentsch proceeds to assert that this ‘does not 
mean to say that it would be impossible to give a working definition of the concept of the 
“uncanny,” since one can perhaps suppose that the impression which generates the feeling 
will be constituted along the same lines for a certain psycho-physiological group’ (p. 8).  
Indeed, theorizing can be seen as an integral part of containing and taming the uncanny in 
that it works to constitute, using Žižek’s triad again, part of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. 
Theorising the Sacred 
In this section we shift our focus from theorising the uncanny, to theorising the sacred.  What 
happens when the sacred is theorised and how does this differ from theorising the uncanny? 
We begin with Belk et al’s paper which not only contains a helpful catalogue of the attributes 
of the sacred, but is also a useful case study of theorists studying the sacred.  This gives an 
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opportunity to examine the relationship between the sacred and the idea of the sacred  or, 
more generally, between theorising and sacralising.  
A key point in Belk et al’s paper is that ‘Anything may become sacred’ (p. 13), and that that 
anything may be something as apparently mundane or prosaic as a collection of Micky 
Mouse memorabilia (p. 30). They make it clear than an object in such a collection is 
semiotically enhanced through ownership/consumption, and is more ‘special’, to the collector 
than, say, an image of Mickey Mouse in a toy store.  However, while one can accept that the 
owner’s ritual care of the collection may be as important and meaningful to the owner as a 
weekly visit to Church is for many others, the salient question is, ‘Is this a good thing?’  Or, 
taking an Aristotelian angle, is this constitutive of the ‘good life’?   Does it matter that 
‘anything may become sacred’?  If it does, how might individuals or a society decide on what 
constitutes the sacred?  
This assertion that ‘anything may become sacred’ is consistent with a wider understanding – 
advanced by Saussurian semiotics, functionalist enthography, the doctrine of cultural 
relativism, individual liberalism, and the sociology of knowledge – that all values are 
ultimately arbitrary.  It matters not a whit whether it is an Amazonian tribal chief worshiping 
a stone, a Catholic nun blessing herself with holy water, or a collector of beer mats ritually 
dusting his collection; the river of sacredness runs through each phenomenon equally.   
Within this world-view, the social theorist is largely indifferent to sacred content, and 
confines herself to presenting an objective understanding of either causality or meaning-
making (as in descriptions of the process of sacralization).   However, this world-view seems 
to distil the ethical problems out of social theorizing, in line with Friedman’s (2002: 12) 
assertion that, ‘a major aim of the liberal is to leave the ethical problem for the individual to 
wrestle with’.  Not only is this an inadequate if not obnoxious mode of being, but it flatly 
fails to resonate with the empirical world.  We don’t, in our own practices, take values to be 
arbitrary, and our institutions continue to operate as if there is external certainty and 
authority.  
In addition to these ethical issues, attempts to theorise the sacred face similar epistemological 
problems to those encountered when theorising the uncanny, in so far as both the uncanny 
and the sacred are mysterious and hence beyond representation, beyond theorising.   
However, theorising the sacred involves a futher issue in that it can work to undermine the 
sacred.  We see this if we imagine a theorist studying a nun blessing herself with what she 
believes to be holy water.  While the water is sacred for the nun, this belief is not shared by 
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the theoriser who instead believes that the water’s ‘powers’ are confined to the community of 
believers and that other communities will ascribe a similar power to other ‘sacred’ objects.  
Moreover, the theorist’s interpretation of the holy water is that, while it is meaningful (or 
meaning-ful) for the nun, it is devoid of at least three properties of the sacred: hierophany 
(the sacred showing itself), kratophany (the sacred’s overwhelming power) and mystery.  In 
other words, the water is sacred for the nun, but not for the theorizer.   Furthermore, if 
theorising is axiomatically about holding beliefs in ultimate uncertainty, then the theorist has 
to reject the concept of the truly sacred because this is axiomatically characterised by 
immediate certainty.  A further twist is that in seeking to analyse, represent, and dissect the 
sacred, sociological theorising can be considered a form of profanity for two reasons.  First, 
because the practice of theorising transgresses the strong avoidance tendencies that are 
axiomatic to the sacred.  Second, because theorising, inspired as it is by a Platonic world-
view, always devalues the particular – even when it is sacred – in favour of the general.  This 
is the deep conundrum at the heart of the peculiarly Western idea that one can somehow step 
outside religious experience, objectify it and theorise the phenomenon.  As the historian of 
religion, Jonathan Z. Smith, put it:  
While there is a staggering amount of data, phenomena, of human experiences and expressions that might 
be characterized in one culture or another, by one criterion or another, as religious, there is no data for 
religion. Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study. It is created for the scholar's analytic 
purposes by his imaginative acts of comparison and generalization. Religion has no existence apart from 
the academy. (Smith 1982: xi). 
We can usefully extend Smith’s critique of religion to the idea of the sacred, to distinctions 
between the secular and sacred realms, and to attempts at theorising the sacred.  Timothy 
Fitzgerald (2000) makes a somewhat similar point arguing that when the category of religion 
(and by implication related terms like the sacred) is used in non-theological (contemporary) 
scholarship, then it has little if any analytical purchase and is likely to confuse rather than 
illuminate: 
One finds in the published work of scholars working within religion departments the term ‘religion’ being 
used to refer to such diverse institutions as totems, the principle of hierarchy, Christmas cakes, witchcraft, 
unconditioned reality, the rights of man, the National Essence, Marxism and Freudianism, the tea 
cermony, nature, ethics, and so on. But it seems obvious that these have very little in common in the 
abstract and that each can only be understood as institutions or ideologies that require interpretation in 
highly specific cultural contexts.  In this case I argue that ‘religion’ dissolves or ought to dissolve without 
remainder into ideology or culture understood as institutionalized values and symbolic systems. 
(Fitzgerald 2000: 17) 
Thus Fitzgerald, seeing no coherent concept of ‘religion’, considers that the term should be 
scrapped, at least within academia.  He takes a similar view on the sacred, distinguishing 
between a theological and non-theological use of the word.  In the former, objects, places and 
times are sacred because they are in some way related to God or the transcendent.  But when 
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the word is used in a non-theological sense, then what is being said is that things are 
considered sacred by a community because they symbolise the community’s values, or 
provide fundamental ways through which the community thinks about itself and the world. In 
this case, the researcher’s legitimate role is ‘to try to understand these collective values in the 
context of their actual institution in society’ (p.19).  However, much like the word ‘religion’, 
there seems no good reason why one should not scrap ‘sacred’ – given its theological 
resonances – and simply speak of the community’s collective values.  Within this paradigm, 
the sacred-profane distinction is understood as a particular distinction within a particular 
sign system of a particular community (this sign system will incorporate other distinctions 
such as young-old, male-female, dirty-clean, urban-rural, etc.).  Nothing is transcendentally 
sacred or transcendentally profane (for to admit this is to allow in a metaphysics that is 
contrary to the Western paradigm of sociological inquiry). 
Re-enchanting theory 
This creates a conundrum as to the appropriate role for the social theorist interested in these 
matters.  A number of options open up. 
One possibility is to follow Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1962/1991) and Dubuisson (2003) and 
abandon the word ‘religion’ (and related words like the sacred and perhaps the uncanny), but 
only so as to foreground the personal, ‘inner’ experiential dimension of religion. Dubuisson 
calls this the “cosmographic formation”, by which he means the universal human response to 
the collection of experiences we call Being, the Sacred or God.  In essence, this is an inquiry 
into inner piety or ‘faith’, though Masuzawa (2000) argues that this is beyond the bounds of 
naturalistic analysis or explanation.  And even though there is a genuine attempt to recognise 
and move away from loaded terms like ‘religion’, it seems likely that religious essentialism 
will still be smuggled in, albeit under cover of complex constructs like ‘cosmographic 
formation’. ‘Faith’, or ‘religion’, or some variant of these concepts must be retained because 
it describes an empirical phenomenon that cannot be included in a wider concept. Religion, in 
this sense, is sui generis.  
Fitzgerald, and McCutcheon agree that terms like ‘sacred’ and ‘religion’ are too loaded by 
half, but, unmoved by the sui generis argument, they instead propose a secular project that 
collapses the sociology of religion into sociology or anthropology.  Similarly, Lease (1994: 
472) asserts that ‘there is no religion: rather such a history [of religion] can only trace how 
and why a culture or epoch allows certain experiences to count as “religion” while excluding 
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others’.  One could detect an actor-network influence in this kind of project, in that the salient 
question is how things like the ‘sacred’, the ‘uncanny’, and ‘religion’ come to be in certain 
contexts and the way in which these categories are used by those that employ them 
(McCutcheon 1997).  Here the focus is on the historical construction and mobilization of a 
particular classification system – as in sacred v secular – and the political and rhetorical 
strategies surrounding such classifications.   
It seems to me than neither the sui generis (theocentric) nor the secular (anthropocentric) 
paradigms are altogether compelling.  The problems with the former are well developed in 
the literature (Smith 1962/1991; Strenski 1973; McCutcheon 1997; Fitzgerald 2000; 
Dubuisson 2003; McCutcheon 2004) and need not be rehersed.  In contrast, the issues with 
the secular (anthropocentric) paradigm are less well articulated, though it is territory that the 
actor-network theorists have begun to explore.  For instance, if we follow McCutcheon and 
focus on the researcher’s role as one centred on mapping and describing how the sacred is 
mobilized as a classification device in particular contestations, then, while this is perhaps 
interesting, it seems quite limited.  It also seems laden with Western understandings of 
objectivity and the primary requirement that the researcher keep her distance from the 
phenomenon under study.  If the sacred provides a lens through which one can interpret 
Christmas gift-giving, tea ceremonies, stamp collecting and the like, then can it not provide a 
similar perspective on ritualistic killing, sadistic behaviour, suicide, child abuse, etc.? But 
more importantly, is the researcher to remain indifferent to these differences? 
One way to unpick things is to think about how uncertainty is construed in the domains of the 
uncanny, the sacred and theorising.  Following Jentsch (1906/1997), the uncanny is 
characterised by intellectual uncertainty, which happens, for example, when an ‘inanimate’ 
object appears to come to life.  In contrast, the realm of the sacred is characterised by 
immediate certainty, in that the true believer does not doubt.  One could argue that theorising 
should be about holding beliefs in uncertainty, and so it resonates more with the uncanny 
than with the sacred. Indeed theorizing might be thought of as a project of disrupting the 
sacred, or, more broadly, disrupting reified parts of the Imaginary that have become 
uncontested or taken-for-granted, as exemplified by Derrida’s project of deconstruction 
(Derrida 1974/1976).  Yet, this is difficult to achieve, not least because we academics have 
become proficient at, if not addicted to, shopping in the vast mall that is the Imaginary, where 
we appropriate and apply an idiosycratic collection of theories, images and narratives. Žižek 
sees the Imaginary and ideology as broadly equivalent terms that describe the fantasy-
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structure that supports our daily reality. ‘The function of ideology’, he asserts, ‘is not to offer 
us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from 
some traumatic, real kernel’ (Žižek 1989: 45).  Of course we cannot escape the myths we live 
by, but perhaps we can at least try to be more attuned to the uncanny, to be more skeptical of 
the Imaginary, and to learn again to be bewildered by this enchanting world in which we find 
ourselves.   
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